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PANEL DISCUSSION
After Professor Summers' speech, Professor Graglia was given a chance
to reply:
I have argued that insofar as constitutional rights are restrictions on self-
government, they require justification, that in our system of self-govern-
ment local autonomy should ordinarily be favored. Professor Summers' re-
sponse that by local autonomy or federalism I mean "states rights" and by
self-government I mean "white power" is an outrageous piece of demagogu-
ery. As a true liberal, he simply cannot resist the temptation to call his
opponent a racist; he has found that it is always a winning move, at least
before a presumably equally liberal academic audience, sure to terminate
any further thought or debate.
I also said that constitutional rights (restrictions on self-government) are
generally not good ideas, that in general today's policy decisions should be
made by today's people; the living should not be governed by the dead.
Professor Summers believes, however, that a system of constitutional rights
enforceable by the Supreme Court is desirable because it brings us back to
our "best moments." The practical result of Summers' view is a unique
system of government: government on basic issues of social policy by ma-
jority vote of a committee of nine lawyers, unelected and holding office for
life, who are assigned the task of bringing us back to our best moments. I
call this the "Ulysses theory" of constitutional restrictions. Ulysses ordered
his men to tie him to the mast in order to disable himself from being se-
duced by the Sirens' song. There are many problems with this. How are a
people to tell their better moments from their other moments? Why should
people not assume that their present views on any current issue, always the
best informed, are most likely to be better?
In any event, the Ulysses theory does not explain much of constitutional
law. For example, when the Court suddenly invalidated the abortion laws
of all fifty states, there was no basis for any argument that it was bringing us
back to one of our better moments. When the Court created a system of
criminal procedure that makes the criminal law ever more difficult to en-
force, few people in this country could think that it brings us back to one of
our finer moments. Only an elevated thinker and idealist like Summers can
think the incredible system of criminal procedure the Court has imposed on
the states in the name of the Constitution is an expression of our finer
moments.
The real difference between Summers and me, however, is not over
whether there should be constitutional rights, that is, whether some issues
should be removed from the political process by a difficult-to-amend Con-
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stitution. The problem with contemporary constitutional law is that it is
not based on the Constitution, that the Court does not confine itself to en-
forcing constitutional rights, but feels free to create new rights. For exam-
ple, if a state denies blacks the right to vote, even if by complex or indirect
means, it is entirely appropriate for the Court to hold, as I tried to indicate
in my discussion of the White Primary cases, that it can't do that. Why
not? Because it's written in the laws of God or nature that blacks must be.
allowed to vote? No, because it's written in the Constitution. The fifteenth
amendment is clear, understandable, and meaningful law, and it is appro-
priate that the Court enforce law. It is not appropriate, however-it is not
consistent with either self-government or federalism-that the Court im-
pose upon us the Justices' views of good social policy, which is what Profes-
sor Summers' view amounts to.
There happens to be nothing in the Constitution that takes from the
states the power to make policy regarding abortion or that prohibits owners
of shopping malls from excluding Vietnam War protestors. There is a first
amendment protecting speech, but its first word is "Congress"; it provides
that "Congress shall make no law. . .," and plainly has no application to
the states. The argument that by ratifying the fourteenth amendment the
states imposed the first amendment on themselves reduces law to trickery,
not an intellectually respectable discipline. I don't know whether privately-
owned shopping malls should be prohibited from excluding political protes-
tors and demonstrators, but I do know that there is no good reason to per-
mit that issue to be settled for the whole country by Brennan and
Blackmun. They have no authority to decide it.
If policymaking by Supreme Court Justices, totally centralized and un-
democratic, is a good form of government, one must wonder why other
countries don't adopt it. I was in Japan a few weeks ago and learned that
under their constitution, adopted during the American occupation, the Jap-
anese Supreme Court can declare laws unconstitutional. The Japanese,
however, are a practical, realistic people, and so their Supreme Court has
never exercised this power. Lower courts have sometimes held a law un-
constitutional, but the Supreme Court Justices take the sensible position
that in all actual cases, the alleged unconstitutionality of a law is at best a
debatable and questionable issue and that such issues are, in a democracy,
to be left to the legislature. It is ironic that the United States, which began
as an experiment in democracy, can now take lessons in democracy from
others.
What has the wonderful institution of judicial review actually done for
us? Has it brought us to a better, higher moral plane, as Summers believes?
In its first significant exercise of the power, the Court gave us the Dred
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Scott1 decision and the Civil War. Was it a good thing to have judicial
review so that the Court could hold, on no good basis, that Congress could
not disallow slavery in new territories? Summers is right that the 1964
Civil Rights Act came later than it should have, but this is only because of
judicial review. Congress had acted to prohibit racial discrimination in
places of public accommodation eighty-nine years earlier in the 1875 Civil
Rights Act. In the Civil Rights Cases,2 however, the Court held the 1875
Act unconstitutional. If Congress had been given the benefit of the doubt,
as the legislature is in Japan, public segregation would have ended almost a
century sooner. If judicial review is the wonderful thing Summers thinks it
is, it must be only because of what it has accomplished more recently, since
really wise and good people like Brennan and Douglas, people who agree
with him and most other law professors, came into control.
A member of the audience challenged that Professor Summers' solution
was not principled. One cannot argue a libertarian interpretation under
the first amendment, letting people say what they want, but deny such
freedom and demand an egalitarian result under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Professor Summers responded:
I will acknowledge that my approach to these problems is "unprincipled"
as that term is often used in the legal context. My view is that we are
engaged in an enterprise of trying to run, to manage, to construct, to enrich
a democratic society. We generally have consensus, when our own oxen are
not being gored, that certain values shall be treated as fundamental, that
they should be protected, that a democratic society requires their recogni-
tion. That consensus is, of course, hazy and uncertain at the outer bounda-
ries. The rights and values cannot be refined down to specific quantities
that can be put in a computer so that one can find all the answers by punch-
ing the right keys. That is why I say that we are involved in the art of
government, not the science of government.
Now, more specifically, what is the role of the court as to discrimination?
There seems no dispute when the discrimination is because of race. Should
its function be the same in sex discrimination, nationality discrimination,
discrimination against homosexuals or those who have AIDS? What we
shall consider inappropriate classifications and what the role of the Court
shall be are not easy questions and cannot be answered by "principled"
decisions. But we do have some sense of the values which we share and
what we consider to be humaneness in our society. Our sense of these val-
ues, our sense of what we want to protect, are not to be looked at by asking
what did Jefferson think 200 years ago. One would hope that in 200 years
1. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
2. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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we have progressed from the values shared when people were hung for
stealing, and slavery was constitutionally enforced-that we would have
developed a greater humaneness. Our sense of values and rights must be
measured by our present consensus. This does not provide positive or prin-
cipled answers, for the outer bounds of consensus are disputed. But it does
provide a way of viewing the role of the court in our art of government.
Let me now come back to the role of the Court in discrimination, and
particularly a case like Shelley v. Kraemer. The Court's minimum responsi-
bility is not to be used to aid discrimination, but to refuse to allow the
judicial process, which is specially charged with protecting rights, to be
used to enforce discrimination. It may be that the courts cannot reach out
to all acts that are discriminatory, but when someone comes to court and
says, "I want your help because our property rights or our contract rights
justify it," the least the courts can do is to say "You may have property
rights, you may have contract rights, but they are subordinate to the rights
of others to protection against discrimination." The message of the court
should be, "Be gone with you." In my view, Shelley v. Kraemer could have
been properly disposed of within the simple framework of contract law if
the state courts had had the gumption to simply say, "This is a contract
contrary to public policy which we will not enforce." That, it seems to me,
is the minimum level of the court's role in the absence of legislation, to
protect against discrimination.
I will go one step further to elaborate on what I said earlier. When Con-
gress has passed a law, like the civil rights law, where the political branches
have acted on their constitutional responsibility, the function of the Court
at that stage in the reiding of that statute is to resolve doubts and ambigui-
ties in a way that will move us in the direction of further protection against
discrimination. Thus, the Court should read the Civil Rights Act with en-
larging generosity, not mutilating narrowness. That is the function of the
Court with reference to the political branches, to act with and in aid of the
political branches in protecting against discrimination and enriching per-
sonal freedoms.
Professor Graglia addressed Professor Summers' reply:
To attempt to state the issue in terms of "humaneness" and "decency" is to
avoid stating any issue. No one here, I take it, is against humaneness and
decency; at least, I represent to you that I am not. The issue is not whether
we favor humaneness, but who should be making the difficult policy choices
that all real cases involve. To have the Court enforce definite and knowable
constitutional provisions, such as the prohibitions on denial of the vote on
grounds of race or sex, is one thing. To permit the Court to advance unde-
fined and unspecified constitutional "values," or simply act to make this a
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more humane or better society, however, is nothing other than to permit
the judges to make public policy.
The Constitution, very sensibly, imposes few restraints on self-govern-
ment, and those restraints are rarely violated. The one giant exception in
our history has to do with race, where violations of clear constitutional
prohibitions have occurred. In most cases, however, it is by no means clear
what decision morality and humaneness require. It is at least debatable
whether a regime of abortion on demand, for example, is an advance in
morality and humaneness.
Professor Gerard noted that Professor Graglia tolerates judicial review in
the area of race relations because of the difficulties which stymied the polit-
ical processes there. He inquired whether, therefore, Professor Graglia is
espousing a view similar to that of John Hart Ely.
No, I do not agree with Ely. Ely approves of everything the Court has done
since 1937 with the exception of its abortion decisions, and I disapprove of
nearly everything the Court has done, including the abortion decisions. Ex-
cept on race issues, all of the Court's controversial so-called constitutional
decisions have no basis in the Constitution; Ely is wrong in thinking that
Roe v. Wade is unique in this respect. Nor would I agree that a Supreme
Court decision holding a law unconstitutional is justified if that decision is
allegedly "representation reinforcing" or corrects an alleged defect in the
political process. The only thing that justifies holding a legislative policy
choice unconstitutional is that it is clearly prohibited by the Constitution.
Otherwise, the Justices are simply substituting their policy views for those
of the people's elected representatives, and I know of no way to justify that.
It is obviously exceedingly dangerous for Supreme Court Justices to decide
for themselves whether the political process is working properly or needs
their help.
Professor Buss then commented on the presentations in general
I've been thinking that the success of Professor Graglia's first book, Disaster
by Decree, has led him to want to write the same book again-not just to
repeat what he said before, but to extend his charge of "disaster" to all of
the other areas to which the Supreme Court has addressed itself.
He was just saying that race is unique. I think his exact words were that
it is "realistic and accurate" to say that there was a national consensus
about race. But I doubt that the national consensus went into very much
detail. That a consensus operated at some level may be true, but exactly
what the consensus meant and how it should be carried out is the problem
that someone-either the courts or others-had to resolve and to put into
effect, which the Supreme Court obviously did, sometimes successfully and
sometimes unsuccessfully. But it seems to me that there is a national con-
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sensus that we have judicial review. It turns out that very much of what
Professor Graglia said by way of criticizing Marbury v. Madison and other
specific cases I tend to agree with, or at least, in making that criticism I play
the same games as Professor Graglia plays when I teach constitutional law.
But it does seem to me that that's a game that doesn't make a great deal of
sense to keep playing. We do have judicial review in this society. I'm pre-
pared to say it doesn't matter very much what the intentions of the framers
were on that issue, because we have the experience of the entire life of the
constitutional system since Marbury. I am also prepared to say that it may
not be working to the satisfaction of everyone, but what that really tells us
is we have to focus on particular exercises of that power and explain why
we think those exercises are wrong, rather than to suggest that every time
we don't agree with particular decisions we can simply go back and say the
Court shouldn't have the power at all. One might suggest that Professor
Graglia's chief concern about judicial review is reminiscent, not of Ulysses,
but of James Joyce's pre-Ulysses work, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young
Man. Professor Graglia suggests to me a portrait of the old man who
wouldn't grow up because, it seems to me, we have to accept the consensus
on judicial review that is a consensus on the basis of what the country has
done over a couple of hundred years.... I admire, and to some extent, as
I've said, agree with a good part of Professor Graglia's criticism. In fact, I
suspect I would agree with him on particular cases about as often as I
would agree with Professor Summers. But it seems to me that he's wrong
in suggesting that the underlying evil that explains all this is that constitu-
tional law is a ruse or a farce or whatever words he used. I think constitu-
tional law is partly like other law and is partly unique. It's partly like other
law in one respect-I think I'm quoting something Professor Graglia said
in referring to a particular case-it's not what the Court says but what it
does that's important....
Let me turn now to the part of constitutional law that I think is unique.
That is that it does involve policy decisions-it does involve what Professor
Graglia has just been talking about in terms of making value judgments.
Here I think Professor Graglia's last statements are right, but I don't think
he takes them totally to heart. It seems to me that it is absolutely correct
that to say the Court should implement fundamental values often isn't go-
ing to tell us very much because fundamental values are in conflict and the
Court has to make choices.
That finally brings us back to the state action point .... There is no
possible way one can read the fourteenth amendment state action provision
without being influenced by one's own values-in particular circumstances,
about the extent to which the individual interest in doing something may be
regarded as impermissibly destructive of someone else's equality. To what
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extent should that interest be protected in the name of treating it as private
action, and to what extent shouldn't it be protected on the theory that the
things being done are state action? There's no way that one can avoid that
kind of difficult determination. I don't see how it helps to suggest that it's
non-law or some sort of fraudulent practice that the Court is involved in
when it engages in what are in fact extraordinarily difficult controversies
that are not going to have consensus by anyone's view. But there are going
to be results that will be satisfactory to some people-satisfactory to more
if the Court explains its result better, satisfactory to fewer if it explains its
results more poorly. It seems to me that's what we have to focus on: how
persuaded we are by what the Court is saying.
Judge Frankel closed out the session by noting the overwhelming support
for incorporation of the first amendment, reaffirmed by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in the recent Hustler Magazine litigation.3 "I would agree with
Professor Buss that some things we should take as established and get on
with it from there."
3. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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